TUNO tuno.limon-it.nl

What do you want to do?

πŸ–₯ Endpoint security

Application control and device security posture.

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AppLocker builder & validator NEW BETA

Import an AppLocker policy XML and audit it with the AppLockerInspector check set β€” enforcement posture, broad principals, user-writable paths, risky wildcards, overly broad publisher rules. Verify the Microsoft apps a locked-down estate still needs (OneDrive first among them) are actually allowed, add the missing rules publisher-first, and export policy XML plus a Markdown report. Runs entirely in the browser.

❓ About this app

What changed, where it is heading, how it works.

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What's new

Everything added or changed, per build.

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Roadmap

Where TUNO is heading β€” shipped, next, later.

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Help

What each tool does, what it reads, and the security model.

πŸ” AppLocker builder & validator BETA

Import a policy XML β€” a GPO export or Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml β€” and it is audited in the browser with the check set from Spencer Alessi's AppLockerInspector. The Microsoft coverage table answers the question every lockdown discovers too late: can a standard user still run OneDrive, Teams, Edge and Office? Build the missing rules publisher-first and export the XML back into your GPO. Nothing is uploaded β€” the file is read in this tab and stays there. NTFS and share ACL reality checks need a filesystem and stay in the PowerShell original.

Start by importing a policy.

From a GPO: Group Policy Management Editor β†’ Application Control Policies β†’ AppLocker β†’ right-click β†’ Export Policy…
From a machine's effective policy (elevated PowerShell): Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective -Xml > policy.xml
Or load the sample policy to see what the audit and the Microsoft coverage check produce.

πŸ“‹ What's new

Everything added or changed in TUNO, newest first.

πŸ—Ί Roadmap

Where TUNO is heading, laid out in time. Order and scope may change β€” real-tenant feedback decides what lands first.
Each item carries a reference (Rnn) so it can be pointed at without quoting the title β€” same rules as ENCA: a reference belongs to its item permanently, is never reused once the item ships, and the numbers are not a priority order. An item that ships moves from Next to Now with its reference intact.

Now shipped & shipping

R01 πŸ” AppLocker builder & validator live Β· build 1 BETA

Web-based AppLocker policy analysis after Spencer Alessi's AppLockerInspector: import the XML, get the weak/misconfigured/risky settings with severity, reason and recommendation β€” plus the check the PowerShell original does not have: a Microsoft app coverage table that verifies OneDrive (per-user!), Teams, Edge, WebView2, Office click-to-run, the Intune agent and friends are actually allowed to run for a standard user, with one-click publisher-first fixes and XML export back into the GPO.

Later

R03 πŸ–₯ Intune device analyzer

The tuno.md original: pick a device and see which groups it is in, which policies land on it and why, and which apps it gets β€” the Intune counterpart of ENCA's per-user policy views.

❓ Help

What TUNO is

TUNO β€” Tenant Utilities for iNtune Operations is ENCA's sister tool (enca.limon-it.nl): the same idea β€” static files running entirely in your browser, minimal delegated Graph permissions asked per tool, nothing stored server-side because there is no server β€” applied to Intune and endpoint security instead of Conditional Access.

πŸ” AppLocker builder & validator

Reads NOTHING from your tenant: the policy XML you import is parsed in this tab, audited with the AppLockerInspector check set, evaluated against a catalog of Microsoft apps (per-user OneDrive is the one everybody breaks), and exported back as XML or a Markdown report. Two honest limits: NTFS/share ACL checks need a filesystem, so run Invoke-AppLockerInspector.ps1 on a host for those; and rule evaluation here is a faithful model (deny beats allow, exceptions, macros, publisher fields), not the AppLocker engine itself β€” test in AuditOnly before enforcing, always.

Security model

Sign-in is a SPA authorization-code + PKCE flow with no client secret β€” the same model as ENCA, documented in SECURITY.md. You can run TUNO on your own single-tenant app registration: New-TunoAppRegistration.ps1 -SingleTenant.